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PARTIAL STRIKES AS UNPROTEC-ED ACTIVITY
UNDER TH[E LMBA
When labor and management struggle for supremacy at the
bargaining table, each has a number of alternative economic weapons
with which to threaten the other. For instance, employees may strike
or picket-these are weapons which the Federal Government has
deemed it necessary to protect. But unions have also attempted to
engage in activity toward which no federal policy is clearly dis-
cernible; included in this category are partial strikes such as slow-
downs, "quickie" stoppages, refusals to work overtime or weekend
strikes. The NLRA' (Wagner Act) was primarily aimed at dis-
couraging employer anti-unionism2 and did not provide for union
unfair labor practices or define acts of employees which were
unprotected. Although § 8(b)3 of the LMRA4 (Taft-Hartley Act)
partially filled this gap, there still exists a great area of employee
activity which is neither an unfair labor practice nor within the broad
scope of § 7,5 which provides, inter alia, that, "Employees shall have
the right ... to engage in ... concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." Indeed,
in passing the LMRA Congress apparently intended to allow elas-
ticity in the interpretation of this section because it was believed
that an inclusion of some activities as unprotected may lead courts
to exclude others not specifically mentioned.6 Thus the courts and
the NLRB engrafted a number of broad exceptions onto the section
-in general, employee activity is unprotected if it is for an unlaw-
ful purpose, by an unlawful means, or is contrary to the legislative
scheme of Congress.7 This classification that activity is unprotected
1. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 151 (1952).
2. See Daugherty & Parrish, The Labor Problems of American Society
785 (1952).
3. For an analysis of the cases involving union unfair labor practices
under § 8(b), see Walsh, Union Unfair Labor Practices, 1 Labor L. J. 1095(1950).
4. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 141 (1952). Title I of
the LMRA is the amended version of the NLRA, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as
amended, 29 U. S. C. § 151 (1952). Hereinafter all references to the statute
will be by section number only, sections 1 through 17 consisting of the
NLRA as amended by the LMRA.
5. See Perry Norvell Co., 23 L. R. R. M. 1061, 1062-1063, 80 N. L. R. B.
225, 241 (1948). See Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26
Ind. L. J. 319, 325 (1951).
6. H. R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1947). See Inter-
national Union, U. A. W. A., A. F. of L., Local 232 v. Wisconsin ERB, 336
U. S. 245, 260-263 (1949).
7. See Gregory, Unprotected Activity and the NLRA, 39 Va. L. Rev.
421, 424 (1953) ; Petro, Concerted Activities-Protected and Unprotected,
1 Labor L. 3. 1155, 1219-1221 (1950), and 2 Labor L. J. 3, 67 (1951) ; Note,
3 Utah L. Rev. 358 (1953). See generally, Cox, supra note 5.
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is significant because an employer does not commit an unfair labor
practice if he discriminates against employees who are engaged in
unprotected activity; they are laid bare to retaliation such as dis-
charge or suspension."
Besides the protected-unprotected question, it is also helpful to
draw a distinction between a strike which is caused by unfair labor
practices of an employer and one which is engaged in by employees
who wish to exert economic pressure for the purpose of collective
bargaining. The distinction is often crucial because an unfair labor
practice striker is usually entitled to reinstatement .even though it
may be necessary for the employer to discharge a replacement in
order to do so; however, the economic striker may be replaced at
any time and is not entitled to "bump" a replacement in order to be
reinstatedY It is only a natural conclusion then that the economic
striker would seek a mode of strike activity which would lessen the
possibility of his being replaced. This factor, plus the more impor-
tant advantage of being able to gain some take home pay while eco-
nomic pressure is being applied against the employer, accounts for
the strong propensity of unions to engage in partial strikes as a
bargaining weapon.
The problem of whether a partial strike is protected or un-
protected presents a conflict between the right of the employer to
direct his working force and the right of employees to engage in
concerted activities as provided for in § 7.10 It may arise in a great
many different contexts and for clarity it is necessary to distinguish
between the sympathetic and the primary partial strike. While both
deal with the problem of the employer's right to control his working
force, the former is not for the immediate purpose of enhancing
the bargaining power of the sympathetic strikers, but is to promote
the interests of the primary striker and although the selfish interest
exists, it is certainly more remote ;"1 on the other hand, the primary
partial strike is for the purpose of exerting direct pressure on the
employer in order to strengthen the bargaining power of his union.
S. Id. at 320.
9. Daykin, Legalized Concerted Activities under the Taft-Hartley Act,
3 Labor L. J. 167, 173-174 (1952).
10. For an analysis of NLRB and court decisions on partial strikes, see
Comment, 21 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 765 (1954).
11. For example: A clerk deliberately neglects processing merchandise
orders which he mistakenly believes had been re-routed from his employer's
strike-bound plant in another city. See NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
157 F. 2d 486, 496-497 (8th Cir. 1946). Non-striking employees honor hit
and run picket lines around their employer's plant, resulting in frequent inter-
ruption of operations. See Pacific Telephone Co., 107 N. L. R. B. No. 301,
33 L. R. R. M. 1433 (1954).
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Thus, although in both instances the employer may suffer from
some amount of intereference, the primary partial striker seeks a
more direct benefit. It is this type of strike as a well planned and
repetitive tactical maneuver fcr the purpose of exerting pressure at
the bargaining table with which this Note is primarily concerned.
I. UNION PARTIAL STRIxE TACTICS
The Briggs-Stratton1 2 decision is by far the most influential rul-
ing in the field of partial strikes. There, the union, without notice
to the employer, called twenty-six "quickie" stoppages in a four and
one-half month period with the avowed purpose of exerting strong
economic pressure upon the employer by interfering with his pro-
duction plans and delivery commitments. Since the dispute arose
under the Wisconsin Peace Employment Act, the State Board
assumed jurisdiction and issued a cease and desist order against the
activity. On certiorari, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, affirm-
ed the Wisconsin Court and held that the State Board properly had
jurisdiction because such intermittent stoppages are neither for-
bidden as unfair labor practices under § 8, nor are they protected
activity within the scope of § 7, and thus, since no federal statute
preempted the area, the state legislation would apply.13 Although
the majority approvingly pointed out that the employer harbored no
anti-union sentiments and sought the most peaceable remedy by re-
questing a cease and desist order against the union rather than re-
sorting to methods of self-help such as discharge or suspension, it is
implicit that the Court would have held the union activity to be
unprotected even if the employer had retaliated. It is worthwhile to
note that the decision permitted the application of a state remedy
which allowed a cease and desist order as opposed to the federal act
that would have permitted the employer to use only methods of
self-help."-
12. International Union, U. A. W. A., A. F. of L., Local 232 v. Wiscon-
sin ERB, 336 U. S. 245 (1949).
13. The Court relied on the legislative history of the LMRA to show
that § 7 does not insulate all union conduct from employer retaliation;
furthermore, § 13, which reaffirms the right to strike, is narrower in scope
than § 7. Id. at 254-264.
Section 13 provides: "Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically
provided herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede
or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or
qualifications on that right"
14. Since the employer was not informed of the union demands which
the intermittent stoppages were designed to enforce or what concessions he
could make to avoid them, it is tenable to argue that the tactics could have
been union unfair labor practices under § 8(b) (3). See Roumell & Schle-
singer, The Preemption Dilemma in Labor Relations, 18 U. of Det. L. J. 17,
28 (1954). See Textile Workers, CIO, 108 N. L. R. B. No. 109, 34 L. R. R. M.
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Since the Supreme Court in the Briggs-Stratton. case had im-
pliedly criticized slowdowns,'1 it is not surprising that the NLRB
held such a partial strike activity to be "indefensible" and thus
unprotected. The Board reasoned that an employee is unfaithful and
may be discharged for breach of his employment contract if he
attempts to work and draw wages at the same time that he exerts
economic pressure against his employer.16 Fortunately, this rationale
has not often been applied to other types of partial strikes, for as
Justice Frankfurter has pointed out, although in a different context:
"i[T]o float such imprecise notions as 'discipline' and 'loyalty'
in the context of labor controversies, as the basis of the right of
discharge is to open the door wide to individual judgment by
Board members and judges." 17
A slowdown is distinguishable from a partial stoppage such as a
refusal to work overtime or a weekend strike even though in both
instances reasonable orders of the employer are being frustrated.
The main distinction is in the detriment the employee must suffer
to exert economic pressure. In the slowdown the employee draws
full pay for reduced production, but in the partial stoppage he
usually suffers loss of wages commensurate to the time not worked.
Prior to the Briggs-Stratton case, the NLRB had steadily main-
tained that partial stoppages were protected. Activities such as a
refusal to work overtime 8 were insulated against employer retalia-
tion. The Board reasoned that this means was tantamount to a total
strike and could not be rendered unprotected in the name of plant
discipline.' 9 Typical of the NLRB's viewpoint was Harnischfeger
1059 (1954), which reaches that result under somewhat similar facts.
Section 8(b) (3) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents "to refuse to bargain collectively with an
employer.....
15. See International Union, U. A. W. A., A. F. of L., Local 232 v.
Wisconsin ERB, 336 U. S. 245, 264 (1949).
16. Elk Lumber Co., 91 N. L. R. B. 333, 26 L. IL R. M. 1493 (1950).
See Note, 60 Yale L. J. 529 (1951). For the view that the slowdown should
not only be unprotected, but should be included as a union unfair labor
practice under § 8(b), see Note, 29 Ind. L. J. 284, 295 (1954).
The LMRA defines strike as "any strike or other concerted stoppage of
work by employees ... and any concerted slowdown or other concerted inter-
ruption of operations by employees." 61 Stat. 161 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 142(2)(1952).
17. NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, International Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers, 346 U. S. 464, 481 (1953) (dissenting opinion). For a
similar argument, see Cyril de Cordova & Bro., 91 N. L. R. B. 1121, 1134-
1135, 26 L. R. R. M. 1628, 1630 (1950) (sympathetic partial strike).
18. C. G. Conn, Ltd., 10 N. L. R. B. 498, 3 L. R. R. M. 445 (1938);
Harnischfeger Corp., 9 N. L. R. B. 676, 3 L. R. R. M. 316 (1938) ; accord,
Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 46 N. L. R. B. 714, 11 L. R. 1. M. 225 (1943)(employee can be layed off as long as he refuses to work overtime, but he
cannot be permanently discharged) ; American Mfg. Concern, 7 N. L. R. B.
753,2 L. R. R. M. 336 (1938).
19. See id. at 759-760, 2 L. R. R. M. at 338-339.
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Corp.2 0 where the employer, who had previously refused to bargain
with the union, was ordered to reinstate with back pay three dis-
charged employees who had instigated a concerted refusal to work
overtime. It was immaterial that the employer suffered economic
injury and disruption of operations because of the activity-total
strikes create much more difficulty and since they are protected,
certainly a refusal to work overtime belongs in the same category.2'
The Board coined a phrase-it can hardly be called a test-now
familiar to labor parlance, "The question . . .is . . .whether this
particular activity was so indefensible, under the circumstances as to
warrant ... discharg[e]. -.
While the NLRB condoned a refusal to work overtime as pro-
tected activity, the courts took the opposite view.23 For instance, in
C. G. Corn, Ltd. v. NLRB 24 such tactics were unprotected because
an employee must either work and negotiate with the employer or
strike in protest-he cannot do both. The decision was not based
upon the inability of the employer to combat this type of an economic
sanction, but upon the theory :hat the employees were not engaged
in a strike of any sort and were attempting to set their own terms
of employment. The rationale insists that the employees must either
engage in a total strike or work as directed. Thus, the Board and
the courts had expressed diametrically opposed views in the area
of partial strikes, but in cases arising after the Briggs-Stratton
decision, the Board has made it quite clear that partial stoppages are
not only unprotected, but may be unfair labor practices.
The difference between these two classifications is fundamental.
Even though all activity which constitutes a union unfair labor
practice is unprotected, 25 the converse of that proposition is not
necessarily true.26 The main distinction is in the available remedies
-while discharge and suspension or other self-help measures of the
20. 9 N. L. R. B. 676,3 L. R_ R. M. 316 (1938).
21. Where employees were engaged in a spontaneous work stoppage to
present a wage grievance, a similar argument was relied upon--"The
language of the Act does not require and its purposes would not be served
by holding that dissatified workmen may receive its protection only if they
exert the maximum pressure and call a strike." NLRB v. Kennametal, Inc.,
182 F. 2d 817, 819 (3d Cir. 1950), 19 A. L. R. 2d 562 and note.
22. Harnischfeger Corp., 9 1,N. L. R. B. 676, 686, 3 L. R. R. M. 316,
319-320 (1938).
.23. NLRB v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 147 F. 2d 262 (6th Cir. 1945);
C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. NLRB, 108 F. 2d 390 (7th Cir. 1939). Cf. Home Beneficial
Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 159 F. 2d 280, 285-286 (4th Cir.), ccrt. denied, 332
U. S. 758 (1947).
24. 108 F. 2d 390 (7th Cir. 1939).
25. See Roumell & Schlesinger, mepra note 14, at 32.
26. See Cox, supra note 5, at 325; Petro, Concerted Activities-Pro-
tected and Unprotected-II, 2 Labor L. J. 3, 4 (1951).
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employer are permitted against both unprotected activities and
union unfair labor practices, the latter is also subject to a cease
and desist order and other broad remedial powers of the NLRB.2 7
In Textile Workers, CIO2 the Board held that a labor union is
guilty of an unfair labor practice, and thus subject to a cease and
desist order, for refusing to bargain in good faith under § 8(b) (3),
if its employees engage in partial and "quickie" work stoppages
during a bargaining impasse.29 The Board spoke clearly on the
reasons for its unique holding:
"We think it clear that such unprotected harassing tactics
were an abuse of the union's bargaining powers--'irreconcilable
with the Act's requirement of reasoned discussion in a back-
ground of balanced bargaining relations upon which good faith
bargaining must rest' 3 -- which impaired the process of collec-
tive bargaining that Congress intended not only to encourage
but to protect."31
Stated in homely phraseology the decision means that these union
strike methods were unfair only because they were so effective as
to disturb the balance of bargaining power. Since the opinion gives
a tremendous scope to § 8(b) (3), it is conceivable that in the future
overly-effective partial strike tactics used to enhance a union's
bargaining power, may be unfair labor practices by the circuitous
method of applying that section. Such a holding tends to preclude
the possibility of collective bargaining but promotes at least tempo-
rary industrial peace because if cease and desist -processes are avail-
able to the employer, he is neither prompted to bargain nor resort
to the disrupting remedies of self-help to escape the burdens of
the partial strike.32 On the other hand, if the strike is only un-
protected and is not found to be an unfair labor practice, the em-
27. Section 10(c).
28. 108 N. L. R. B. No. 109,34 L. R. R. M. 1059 (1954).
29. The union tactics included a refusal to work overtime, an unauthor-
ized extension of rest periods, a refusal to work special hours, slowdowns,
unannounced walkouts, and inducing employees of a subcontractor not to
work for the employer. The Board was also influenced by the fact that the
employer was not advised by the union as to what concessions he would have
to make to avoid these tactics. See Textile Workers, CIO, 108 N. L. R. B.
No. 109, 34 L. R. R. M. 1059, 1062 (1954).
30. Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corp., 101 N. L. R. B. 360,
368, 31 L. R. R. M. 1072, 1075 (1952). In that case the N. L. R. B. held that
it was not an employer unfair labor practice under § 8(a) (5) to refuse to
bargain with a union which was engaging in a slowdown.
31. Textile Workers, CIO, 108 N. L. R. B. No. 109, 34 L. R. R. M.
1059, 1062-1063 (1954).
32. In the Textile Workers case it is interesting to speculate as to why
the employer did not resort to self-help. Was the labor market so sparse that
the possibility of replacement was nil if he had discharged the employees?
Was it necessary for him to meet certain commitments relative to goods
contracted to be sold so that he could ill afford to discharge? Did he fear ad-
verse public opinion if there were discharges?
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ployer's only remedy is self-help and he may often find it eco-
nomically wise to engage in at least some collective bargaining (even
if he is not legally obligated to do so) 3 3 before resorting to dis-
charge and the resulting difficulty of replacement. Thus two pur-
poses of the LMRA-to encourage collective bargaining and to
promote industrial peace3 4-are in some degree of conflict. The
proper result as to whether aa activity should be found an unfair
labor practice will depend on whether the tactics used, though they
are unprotected, are believed to be so "indefensible" as to militate
against the advisability of allowing them to exert any economic
pressure. Although the multiple methods of the union in the Textile
Workers case may have merited the cease and desist remedy, it is .
doubtful whether all partial strikes belong in this category, and the
NLRB did not imply such a result. It must also be recognized that
as a practical matter the cease and desist order requires such a time
consuming process85 that the employer will often be forced to resort
to self-help in order to escape immediate economic and operational
difficulties.
In view of the preceding cases, it is not surprising that the
NLRB held a partial stoppage unprotected even though it was
resorted to as a self-help device in retaliation against the employer's
unfair labor practices.3" Although this is the customary result in
some other areas of unprotected activity,3 7 it seems unsound to de-
mand that employees either engage in a total strike or, if no other
self-help method is available, endure the employer's unfair labor
practices until a cease and desist order can be obtained.3 8
33. See note 30 supra.
34. See § 1. See Gregory, L.bor and the Law 229-230 (rev. ed. 1949).
35. The "average median" number of days elapsing between the filing of
an unfair labor practice petition and the Board's final decision during the
second half of the 1953 fiscal year was 350 days. 18 NLRB Ann. Rep. 3 (1953).
36. Valley City Furniture Co., 110 N. L. R. B. No. 216, 35 L. R. R. M.
1265 (1954) (refusal to work overtime).
37. Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U. S. 31, 46 (1942) (strike
on board ship) ; NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240, 252-
254 (sit-down strike), 23 Minn. L. Rev. 700 (1939) ; National Electric Prod-
ucts Corp., 80 N. L. R. B. 995, 23 L. R. R. M. 1148 (1948) (breach of no--
strike clause in collective bargaining contract).
38. However, the First Circuit has recently recognized that the NLRB
has the power under § 10(c) to reinstate with back pay unfair labor practice
strikers who engage in unprotected activity. See NLRB v. Thayer Co.,
213 F. 2d 748, 753 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U. S. 748 (1954).
"It ordinarily may be assumed that the Board, as a part of the process
of determining whether reinstatement will effectuate the policies of the Act,
will balance the severity of the employer's unfair labor practice which pro-
voked the industrial disturbance against whatever employee misconduct may
have occurred in the course of the strike." Id. at 755. See Cox, mupra note 5,
at 324 n. 24.
Section 10(c) provides, inter alia, that in granting remedies against
[Vol. 39:764
As has been noted, the clear weight of authority insists that the
partial strike is unprotected. The tendency has been to view the
problem in terms of absolutes-either an activity was protected and
thus completely insulated from employer discrimination or it was
unprotected and subject to any degree of retaliation. No compro-
mise between the antithetical concepts of protected and unprotected
was sought or discovered, but the weekend strike seemed to merit
an attempt to find such a middle ground. In Honolulu Rapid Transit
Co.39 the union engaged in that tactic to break an impasse in bar-
gaining negotiations. The employer retaliated by ordering a one
day suspension for each weekend violation and when this did not
deter the union, the penalty was increased to 15 days. A badly split
Board, writing three opinions, held, 4-1, that the employer had not
committed an unfair labor practice by suspending his employees.
Members Beeson and Rodgers relied on the formalistic reasoning
of the Conn case that the employees must either strike or work,
but Chairman Farmer and Member Peterson, although concurring
in the result, attempted to justify the employer's disciplinary actions
without condemning the union's strike tactics. They believed that
the employer's disciplinary measures were "reasonably calculated to
protect his right to carry on his business and ... not.. . retaliatory
in motivation or effect." 40 Their concurring opinion carries the im-
plication that a different result would have been reached had the
employees been discharged instead of only suspended. Member
Murdock, believing that the activity should be protected, dissented
from both opinions. As he points out, the planned weekend strike
presents a problem much different from the slowdown cases of
disloyalty and the intermittent stoppages which disrupt complex
employer planning. The concurring opinion allows what may be
called non-discriminatory retaliation against unprotected activity,
for reasonable action clearly occasioned by economic need instead
of anti-union motive is not properly termed discrimination; for
example, employers may replace economic strikers 1 and, in certain
unfair labor practices the Board shall "take such affirmative iction including
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the
policies of this subchapter."
For the relevancy of the equitable doctrine of "clean hands" to the prob-
lem of reinstating workers who have engaged in activities not sanctioned by
the LMRA, see NLRB v. Kingston Cake Co., 206 F. 2d 604, 611 (3d Cir.
1953).
39. 110 N. L. R. B. No. 244, 35 L. R. R. M. 1305 (1954).
40. Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., 110 N. L. R. B. No. 244, 35 L. R. R. M.
1305, 1307 (1954).
41. E.g., NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U. S. 333, 345 (1938).
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situations, engage in lockouts, 42 although these measures, of neces-
sity, injure union effectiveness. However, an insistence that the
employer's sanctions must not be "retaliatory in motivation or
effect" may require a search into factors that are often indiscernible.
It has been pointed out in a different context, that there is little to be
gained by attempting to distinguish "between an intent to destroy
a union and an intent to counteract or reduce a union bargaining posi-
tion." 43 Where the economic need and the anti-union motive are
inseparably interwoven, it would seem that if the sanctions im-
posed by the employer were stronger than could be "reasonably
calculated to protect his right to carry on his business," the pre-
sumption would arise that they were "retaliatory in motivation in
effect." So, in many cases, this test would necessitate and permit an
inquiry only into the question of how much force would have been rea-
sonably calculated to defeat the strike tactic. If a type of partial strike
is held unprotected only because it is a weapon that is too effective,4'
the proper remedy would be to allow the employer to exert sanctions
necessary to combat it, and not any amount of retaliation that he
chooses. The concurring opinion is of further significance because
it vaguely suggests a "balance of rights" as a whole new approach
to the partial strike problem. 45 This intimation is a proper one if the
NLRB has accepted the duty of protecting the balance of bargain-
ing weapons,4 6 and although it opens the door to individual judg-
ment as to the degree of "indefensibility" exhibited by the varied
partial strike tactic, its flexibility is more commendable than a strike
or work rule-especially in view of the absence of a legislative man-
date.47
II. REMEDIES OF THE EMPLOYER
One customary remedy of an employer is the right to replace
protected economic strikers; he may not discharge them, 48 but he
can permanently replace those who are on strike.' 9 Replacement
42. See the NLRB policy statements of Chairman Farmer, reprinted ih
part at 33 L. R. R. M. 100 (1954). For the legality of an employer's lock-
out generally, see Comment, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 419 (1953).
43. Koretz, Legality of the Lockout, 4 Syracuse L. Rev. 251, 268 (1953).
44. See International Union, U. A. W. A., A. F. of L., Local 232 v.
Wisconsin ERB, 336 U. S. 245, 269-270 (1949) (dissenting opinion). See Cox,
supra note 5, at 338-339.
45. "We are of the opinion, however, that the question presented in this
case involves a balancing of the broad statutory right of employees to engage
in concerted activities against the employer's right to carry on his business."
Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., 110 N. L. R. B. No. 244, 35 L. R. R. M. 1305,
1307 (1954) (concurring opinion).
46. See note 31 supra, and text thereto.
47. See note 6 supra, and text thereto.
48. E.g., NLRB v. Globe Wireless, Ltd., 193 F. 2d 748 (9th Cir. 1951).
49. See note 9 supra.
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without discharge is plainly impossible when the employee has
not left his work as in slowdowns; it is of little practical significance
if there is a refusal to work overtime or an intermittent stoppage,
for few employees could be secured to work for such a short time
and the resulting confusion would be unthinkable. Replacement is a
bit more realistic although certainly difficult where the weekend
strike is concerned; for instance, in the Honolulu case, it is possible
that weekend bus drivers could have been secured, but it cannot
be seriously suggested that such a remedy is an adequate one.
If the employer suffers economic loss due to the constant dis-
ruption of production that results from partial strikes, he may call
a lockout without committing an unfair labor practice." This method
of self-help frustrates the effectiveness of the employee strike tactic,
but it may create an adverse public opinion toward the employer.51
In the attempt to find a more adequate remedy which would pre-
serve the right of employees to engage in concerted activity without
depriving the employer of the right to control his working force,
it has been suggested "that partial strikes be protected unless and
until the employer exercises an option to require the employees to
go out on a full strike or work as directed. 15 2 Of course this rule,
which allows the employer to force the employee into the status of a
full time economic striker who may be replaced, would require that
the employer receive timely notice of the intent to engage in a partial
strike tactic so that he may intelligently exercise the option. 3
Such advance notice would insure stability of the employer's opera-
tions and allow him to plan for the difficulties caused by the partial
strike5 4 Although the notice factor has never been judicially articu-
lated, the other elements of the option plan have been occasionally
suggested by the NLRB,-" but repeatedly repudiated by the
50. International Shoe Co., 93 N. L. R. B. 907, 27 L. R. R. M. 1504(1951). A lockout may be used by the employer even if the union activity
is protected, but he must apparently show that it is occasioned by economic
necessity. See Koretz, supra note 43, at 254-257.
51. See Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor Relations 287 (1949).
52. Comment, 21 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 765, 773 (1954).
53. Id. at 773-775.
54. Under this solution all "quickie' strikes, such as in the Briggs-
Stratton case, would be unprotected because, by definition and design, the
employer has no chance to set his defenses. The slowdown would be un-
protected if the employer did not receive prior notice of the decreased pro-
ductivity. Similarly, sympathy strikes require adequate notice to the employer
because the presence of the strike may not be immediately discovered by him.
55. Rockaway News Supply Co., 95 N. L. R. B. 336, 28 L. R. R. M.
1314 (1951) ; Montgomery Ward & Co., 64 N. L. R. B. 432, 17 L. R. R. M.
111 (1945); Gardner-Denver Co., 58 N. L. R. B. 82, 15 L. R. R. M. 22
(1944); Pinaud, Inc., 51 N. L. R. B. 235, 12 L. R. R. M. 249 (1943); Mt
Clemens Pottery Co., 46 N. L. R. B. 714, 11 L. R. R. M. 225 (1943).
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courts,56 as a solution to both the primary and sympathetic partial
strike. The plan would not be difficult to administer. If ample notice
of the tactic were given by the union, the employees would be assured
that the employer must exercise his option before they could be dis-
charged. If the option were exercised, and the union chose to go on
total strike, the striker would be entitled to his job only if he re-
applied before he was replaced, just as any economic striker. Thus,
in effect, the plan gives the striker a few days of grace (until a re-
placement is hired) to ponder the wisdom of his action. This is of
tremendous importance when the strike is a spontaneous, tempo-
rary, or trigger-like reaction of employees rather than a well thought
out, planned and repetitive tactical maneuver; however, these spon-
taneous stoppages have generally been held protected7 and so it is
unnecessary to invoke the option plan. The efficacy of this solution
as applied to a planned tactical strike is inversely proportionate to
the possibility of swift efficient replacement, and since the success
of a total strike is often dependent upon this same factor, it seems
that the plan would not generally accomplish very much. Further-
more, while it tends to save the employee from the possibility of dis-
charge, it does not recognize any degree of "indefensibility" as the
"balance of rights" method is equipped to do.
III. CONCLUSION
Of course, the basic question is whether any type of partial strike
should be protected. The NLRB has clearly answered in the affirma-
tive as to spontaneous primary partial strikes. But the tactical strike
stands on a different footing and the tendency has been to hold it
totally unprotected on the basis of the formalistic rule of "strike or
work" enunciated in the Conn case. This result is justified in many
56. See NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 197 F. 2d 111, 114 (2d
Cir. 1952), aff'd, 345 U. S. 71 (1953) ; NLRB v. Mt Clemens Pottery Co.,
147 F. 2d 262, 266-267 (6th Cir. 1945).
57. E.g., NLRB v. J. I. Case Co., 198 F. 2d 919 (8th Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U. S. 917 (1953) ; NLRB v. Kennametal, Inc., 182 F. 2d 817
(3d Cir. 1950), 19 A. L. R. 2d 562 and note. But ef. NLRB v. Condenser Corp.
of Am., 128 F. 2d 67, 77 (3d Cir. 1943).
An announced strike for one day is protected activity for which the em-
ployees cannot be discharged. Buzza-Cardozo, 97 N. L. R. B. 1342, 29
L. R. R. M. 1251 (1952), enforcenent granted in part, 205 F. 2d 889 (9th Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 346 U. S. 923 (1954) ; cf. NLRB v. Good Coal Co., 110
F. 2d 501 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U. S. 630 (1940).
However, employees will be improtected after one stoppage if it is clear
that they intend to repeat the procedure. Valley City Furniture Co., 110
N. L. R. B. No. 216, 35 L. R. R. M. 1265 (1954) ; Kohler Co., 108 N. L. L B.
No. 41, 33 L. R. R. M. 1510 (1954), enforcement granted, 35 L. R. R. M. 2606
(7th Cir. 1955). But cf. Southern Silk Mills, 101 N. L. R. B. 1, 31 L. R. R. M.
1004 (1952), enforcement granted, 209 F. 2d 155 (6th Cir. 1953), rehlearing
denied, 210 F. 2d 824 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U. S. 976 (1954).
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